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ABSTRACT
During volcanic eruptions, Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres issue ash advisories for aviation showing the
forecasted outermost extent of the ash cloud. During the 2010 Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull eruption, the
Met Office produced supplementary forecasts of quantitative ash concentration, due to demand from airlines.
Additionally, satellite retrievals of estimated volcanic ash concentration are now available. To test how these
additional graphical representations of volcanic ash affect flight decisions, whether users infer uncertainty in
graphical forecasts of volcanic ash, and how decisions are made when given conflicting forecasts, a survey was
conducted of 25 delegates representing U.K. research and airline operations dealing with volcanic ash. Re-
spondents were more risk seeking with safer flight paths and risk averse with riskier flight paths when given
location and concentration forecasts compared to when given only the outermost extent of the ash. Re-
spondents representing operations were more risk seeking than respondents representing research. Addi-
tionally, most respondents’ hand-drawn no-fly zoneswere larger than the areas of unsafe ash concentrations in
the forecasts. This conservatism implies that respondents inferred uncertainty from the volcanic ash con-
centration forecasts. When given conflicting forecasts, respondents became more conservative than when
given a single forecast. The respondents were also more risk seeking with high-risk flight paths and more risk
averse with low-risk flight paths when given conflicting forecasts than when given a single forecast. The results
show that concentration forecasts seem to reduce flight cancellations while maintaining safety. Open dis-
cussions with the respondents suggested that definitions of uncertainty may differ between research and
operations.
1. Introduction
a. Background
Volcanic ash is a significant hazard to aviation. For
example, volcanic ash contains silica particles, which
melt when drawn into airplane engines. This can
cause temporary engine failure and permanent engine
damage. Although avoiding flying through volcanic
ash reduces the risk of engine damage or failure, it also
disrupts air traffic, resulting in substantial financial
losses for the aviation industry. For example, the 2010
eruption of Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull dis-
rupted airspace over Europe for 13 days with over
95 000 flights grounded. This cost an estimated EUR3.3
billion in losses to the airline industry (Mazzocchi et al.
2010). One reason the event was so disruptive was that
it occurred in the highly congested European airspace:
918 million people traveled by air in the European
Union in 2014 (European Commission 2016). The 2010
eruption was not necessarily a rare event: a study of
historic eruptions in Iceland over the past 1100 years
shows that volcanic eruptions occur 20–25 times every
100 years, with approximately three-quarters of these
eruptions being explosive (Thordarson and Larsen
2007). Some of these eruptions can release much more
ash into the atmosphere and erupt for longer (months
to years) than the 2010Eyjafjallajökull eruption (Thordarson
and Larsen 2007). Globally, volcanic eruptions occur
nearly daily.
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The decision of whether to fly during volcanic erup-
tions is solely the responsibility of the airline operator,
not the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA; Safety and
Airspace Regulation Group 2014). However, the CAA
does require a safety risk assessment to be conducted
before the operator is allowed to fly in airspace con-
taminated by volcanic ash. The safety risk assessment
ensures that the operator has a safety management
system, a proven safety record, the ability to evaluate
volcanic ash risk, documented procedures (such as how
to avoid ash en route), and received training in unusual
circumstances and emergencies, and that it understands
the impact of volcanic ash on the aircraft. The safety risk
assessment must then be approved by the CAA (Safety
and Airspace Regulation Group 2014).
The other requirement the CAA places on flights in
airspace affected by volcanic ash is that operators are
required to use Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC)
advisories, which are produced in both graphic and text
formats. The London VAAC, based at theMet Office, is
responsible for issuing volcanic ash advisories for the
United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Iceland, and
Scandinavia. The volcanic ash advisories, approved by
the International Civil Aviation Organization, forecast
the farthest extent of the ash cloud on three pre-
approved flying altitudes.
b. Past literature
Questions of decision-making in natural hazards have
been widely studied, involving participants who are both
experts and nonexperts. Experts may behave differently
from nonexperts because of their familiarity with the
hazard, data presentation, and the types of decisions that
are made in the face of these hazards. Indeed, experts
have been shown to have different risk perceptions than
nonexperts in hazards such as flash flooding (Morss et al.
2016) and therefore may be expected to behave differ-
ently in decision tasks.
However, similar to nonexperts, experts can succumb
to cognitive biases, such as positive versus negative
framing (e.g., Taylor et al. 1997) and anchoring (e.g.,
Whyte and Sebenius 1997; Englich et al. 2006). Addi-
tionally, some studies suggest that experts may not be-
have differently in decision tasks than nonexperts. In a
study of decision-making with different types of wind
forecasts, both expert and novice forecasters had similar
results: they performed most accurately when using a
box plot, succumbed to anchoring when the worst-case
scenario forecast was presented, and chose a box plot
as a forecast aid because it was the easiest to use (Nadav-
Greenberg et al. 2008a).
Other studies suggest that the classification of a par-
ticipant as an ‘‘expert’’ may not be as important as other
factors. In a decision-task study of military personnel,
the amount of direct experience in a combat operations
center significantly affected decisions, whereas rank and
years of service did not (St. John et al. 2000). In another
decision task, numeracy (which can vary widely across
expert groups) predicted how well participants per-
formed when given probabilistic information (Peters
et al. 2006). Because there is not necessarily a distinction
between how experts and nonexperts perform in de-
cision tasks, literature using both groups as participants
have guided our research questions (discussed in
section 1c).
Both experts and nonexperts are able to process and
use forecast information that is inherently uncertain to
make decisions. For example, a nonexpert student
sample was able to understand basic hurricane track
information (Wu et al. 2014). Additionally, evidence
suggests that experts (e.g., St. John et al. 2000; Aerts
et al. 2003; Riveiro et al. 2014) and nonexperts (e.g.,
Morss et al. 2010; Correll and Gleicher 2014) interpret
probabilities well enough to inform decisions when
given uncertainty information on topics such as military
tactics, land use, air traffic control, voter preference,
snowfall predictions, and payout expected by a fund.
Even with unfamiliar hazards or information, risk
judgments can improve when training is provided (e.g.,
McCloy et al. 2007).
Although experts and nonexperts can understand and
use natural hazard information in decision-making, their
decisions may change based on how the information is
presented. For example, for flood risk, a sample of
nonexperts indicated that, ‘‘within 40 years, there’s a
33% probability of a flood’’ was riskier than ‘‘each year,
there’s a 1% probability of a flood,’’ even though they
represent the same likelihood of flooding (Keller et al.
2006). Similarly, the way information is shown for other
hazards, such as wind, hurricanes, snow, and pre-
cipitation, has been shown to affect decisions in experts
(e.g., Nadav-Greenberg et al. 2008b; Cox et al. 2013) and
nonexperts (e.g., Ibrekk and Morgan 1987; Abraham
et al. 2015; Ruginski et al. 2015). However, in one study
on hurricanes, nonexperts perceived no significant dif-
ference in the likelihood of a hurricane striking a loca-
tion when the hurricane forecasts showed the forecast
track only, uncertainty cone only, or the forecast track
with an uncertainty cone (Wu et al. 2014). These studies
suggest that further research needs to be conducted on
the effect of information design on decision-making.
One subset of research on decision-making in-
vestigates whether giving more detailed information
about a natural hazard affects respondents’ decisions.
Providing probabilistic forecast information rather than
deterministic forecast information has been shown to
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encourage more economically rational decisions for
both experts (e.g., Kirschenbaum and Arruda 1994;
St. John et al. 2000; Nadav-Greenberg et al. 2008b; Riveiro
et al. 2014) and nonexperts (e.g., Joslyn et al. 2007;
Nadav-Greenberg and Joslyn 2009; Roulston and
Kaplan 2009; Joslyn and LeClerc 2012). Elaboration of
the impact of a hazard also affects decisions: more se-
rious volcanic eruption impacts encouraged more
members of a community to take protective action
(Ekker et al. 1988).
Increasing the resolution of the hazard information
has also been tested. In the United States, reducing the
size of tornado warnings from county level to be poly-
gons within and between counties had an effect on
protective action, with more nonexperts choosing to
take protective action when given smaller warning
polygons proximate to their locations (Nagele and
Trainor 2012). When testing between deterministic and
probabilistic tornado warning graphics, Ash et al. (2014)
found that probabilistic forecasts encouraged nonexpert
protective action in the highest risk areas. In addition,
nonexperts indicated a nonzero probability of a tornado
occurring just outside the warning areas, whereas with
the deterministic polygon, the risk was perceived as lo-
calized to within the polygon (Ash et al. 2014). Providing
airline pilots more information about the predicted fu-
ture location of nearby aircraft encouraged safer de-
cisions to prevent collisions (Wickens et al. 2000). These
studies suggest that providing more information about a
hazard encourages safer andmore economically rational
decisions.
Another important aspect of decision research is how
users interpret deterministic forecasts when no un-
certainty is provided. When given a deterministic
forecast and decision task for either managing reser-
voir levels given a rain forecast or protecting crops
given a temperature forecast, nonexperts took pro-
tective action even when the forecast was on the safe
side of the given threshold, inferring there was un-
certainty in the forecast (Morss et al. 2010). In another
study, when nonexperts were given only a deterministic
wind speed or temperature forecast, they forecasted
much lower values than those given in the forecast,
indicating they adjusted the forecast, perhaps based on
the amount of uncertainty they perceived in the fore-
cast (Joslyn et al. 2011). Nonexperts also inferred ad-
ditional uncertainty information into a probability of
an event occurring in a one-week period, suggesting
that the event was more likely toward the end than the
beginning of the week (Doyle et al. 2014). These
studies indicate that experts and nonexperts infer un-
certainty into text-based deterministic forecasts when
it is not explicitly stated.
Uncertainty can also be inferred in graphical fore-
casts. For example, nonexperts tend to infer a normal
distribution of probabilities into a deterministic fore-
cast, with a higher probability in the middle of a
graphically defined area and lower probabilities toward
the outside in both temperature forecasts (e.g., Tak et al.
2015) and tornado warnings (e.g., Sherman-Morris and
Brown 2012; Ash et al. 2014; Lindell et al. 2016). How-
ever, in some circumstances, such as with tornadoes, the
highest risk areas are at the edges, not in the middle of
the polygon (Ash et al. 2014). Another way in which
inferred uncertainty is evident is in the perception of risk
just outside the warning or forecast area. Some studies
have shown that nonexperts acknowledge a low but
nonzero tornado probability just outside of tornado
warning areas (e.g., Nagele and Trainor 2012; Lindell
et al. 2016) and the hurricane cone of uncertainty
graphic (e.g., Wu et al. 2014). However, other studies on
the hurricane cone of uncertainty graphic suggest that
nonexperts gain little understanding of the uncertainty
in hurricane track forecasts from the polygon graphic
because they either are too focused on the forecast track
line (e.g., Broad et al. 2007) or else only interpret the
direction of hurricane motion from the graphic (e.g., Wu
et al. 2015). When inferring uncertainty into de-
terministic graphical forecasts, users may be inferring
uncertainty incorrectly, which may lead to unsafe
decisions.
c. Research questions
The combination of previous decision-based research
and the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption brought up three
questions, which are the focus of this paper. First, during
the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, the Met Office began
producing supplementary forecasts of ash concentration
in addition to the official VAAC forecasts showing the
farthest extent of the ash cloud (Webster et al. 2012).
Additionally, satellite retrievals of volcanic ash con-
centrations are becoming available. These changes in
availability of graphical representations raised the
question, How are different representations of ash
concentration interpreted and used tomake decisions by
the aviation industry as well as the researchers who
created these graphics?
Past research suggests that increasing the amount of
information given about hazards leads to decisions
that are safer and more economically rational. There-
fore, the responses to the Met Office supplementary
volcanic ash concentration forecasts and satellite re-
trievals of volcanic ash concentration may encourage
safer decisions while still reducing the number of un-
necessary flight cancellations. However, previous re-
search has not tested how including more information
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graphically affects decision-making in a volcanic ash
context.
The second research question addressed in this article
is, Without uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty in 3D location
or concentration of volcanic ash) being explicitly rep-
resented graphically in volcanic ash forecasts, howmuch
uncertainty are users inferring from the forecasts? Does
inferring uncertainty result in risky or overconservative
flight decisions? Past research suggests that users may
infer uncertainty into both text-based and graphical
deterministic forecasts, but they may make different
inferences for volcanic ash. Therefore, it is important to
understand how users make inferences about un-
certainty from volcanic ash forecasts.
During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, more than
one VAAC provided volcanic ash forecasts, which were
sometimes slightly different due to differences in the
model being used and assumptions made about the state
of the volcano. This problem inspired our third research
question, How are operational decisions made when
experts are given conflicting forecasts? Little research
has been conducted on this topic, although it has been
shown previously that experts do seek multiple sources
of information to confirm their decisions (e.g., Morss
et al. 2015).
To answer these questions, a survey was conducted at
the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)
Volcanic Ash Workshop in London, United Kingdom,
on 22 February 2016. The workshop brought together 25
delegates representing research and airline operations
(including pilots, engine manufacturers, airline repre-
sentatives, and the Civil Aviation Authority) to discuss
recent advances in volcanic ash forecasting and obser-
vations, ongoing challenges, and visualizations.
2. Methods
a. Participants
The Volcanic Ash Workshop was a 1-day meeting
in London, funded by NERC on 22 February 2016,
designed to encourage discussion about volcanic ash
from both academic and private sectors. The partici-
pants invited to the workshop were a mixture of airline
operators, policymakers, and researchers (both aca-
demic and embedded in the aviation industry). In-
vitations to the workshop were extended to colleagues
the coauthors had worked with previously on the topic
of volcanic ash with further invitations being extended
by the recommendations of those invited. Out of 78 in-
dividuals invited to the Volcanic Ash Workshop, 25
attended (excluding the coauthors and organizers). The
final survey was completed by all 25 delegates. All
attendees of the Volcanic AshWorkshop, except for the
coauthors of this paper, agreed to participate in the
survey.
Of the 25 respondents, 16 represented research (the
majority of researchers were working at a university, but
some were researchers were embedded in institutions
such as the Met Office) and 9 represented operations
(including flight planners, airline manufacturers, airline
representatives, pilots, and employees of the CAA). The
level of job experience ranged from 2 to 18 years with a
mean of 7 years. The respondents ranged in age from 28
to 69 with a mean age of 46. Most (80%) respondents
were male. Although the 25-respondent sample size for
this decision-making survey is small, expert groups are
naturally smaller than public samples.
Because the sample size was small, comparing re-
sponses between other variables, such as age and gen-
der, was not possible either because the sample size
would be too small for one group or because no mean-
ingful divisions between participants could be made.
Comparisons between job experience were tested be-
tween those with less than or equal to 5 years of job
experience and those with more than 5 years of job ex-
perience. The responses for these two groups were not
significantly different.
b. Materials
This study was given favorable ethical opinion for
conduct by the University Research Ethics Committee.
The survey used in this study was piloted with five
doctoral students from the University of Reading Me-
teorology Department. The survey was distributed once
the delegates arrived. The delegates were informed that
participation was entirely voluntary; however, every
delegate participated in the survey. Respondents were
given approximately 45min to complete the survey.
After they had completed the survey, there were a series
of presentations from operations specialists and re-
searchers discussing current challenges and recent ad-
vances in volcanic ash forecasting and observations. At
the end of the day, there was an open group discussion
about forecasting and communicating uncertainty of
volcanic ash in aviation.
The survey consisted of four sections: low-, medium-,
and high-risk flight decisions across three different
graphic types: drawing no-fly zones onto four volcanic
ash forecasts, four flight decisions giving conflicting in-
formation, and sociodemographic information. The four
sections were presented in the same order for each re-
spondent; however, the order of the graphics or fore-
casts was randomized within each section.
In the first section, respondents were given four flight
paths overlaid onto a volcanic ash forecast (Fig. 1a). The
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respondents then determined whether they would ap-
prove the flight paths. The four flight paths were high risk
(flight pathA, going through the center of the volcanic ash
plume), medium–high risk (flight path B, going through
the polygon and going just outside the high levels of
concentration in the filled contour and satellite graphics,
described further below), medium–low risk (flight path C,
going through the polygon and going just inside medium
levels of concentration in the filled contour and satellite
graphics), and low risk (flight path D, skimming the out-
side of the volcanic ash plume). Respondents were given
the same flight paths and forecasts for three different
graphic types: polygon, filled contour, and satellite.
The polygon graphic was similar to the official VAAC
forecasts, showing the outermost extent of volcanic ash.
The VAAC graphic is created by forecasters using an
atmospheric dispersion model, local observations, re-
ports from pilots, and satellite data (described below)
(Millington et al. 2012). Operationally, these forecasts
are presented in both graphical and text format, so they
can be transmitted to pilots midflight. Because of char-
acter limits in the text forecasts, the VAAC official
polygons have limited complexity.
The filled contour graphic was similar to the forecast
distributed by theMetOffice since the 2010Eyjafjallajökull
eruption and showed both ash location and concentration.
FIG. 1. Survey questions and graphical representations used for decision-making for (a) part 1, (b) part 2, and (c) part 3 of the survey.
(a) The same four flight paths were overlaid onto the polygon, filled contour, and satellite representations of the same volcanic ash
forecast. Respondents were asked whether they would approve each forecast and their confidence in their decisions. (b) Two forecasts
(solid and gap) were represented in two ways (filled contour and satellite). Respondents were asked to draw a no-fly zone on the forecasts
and their confidence in their no-fly zones. (c) Respondents were given conflicting forecasts for the same flight path andwere askedwhether
they would approve each forecast and their confidence in their decisions. The flight paths went through the following colored concen-
tration contours: blue–blue, gray–gray, red–blue, or red–gray. For all figures, respondents were told it was safe to fly through medium
concentrations of volcanic ash (2000–4000mgm23), corresponding to the blue and gray areas in the filled contour representation and the
green, yellow, and orange areas in the satellite representation.
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Similar to the polygon graphic, the filled contour
graphic is created by forecasters using an atmospheric
dispersionmodel, local observations, reports from pilots,
and satellite data (Millington et al. 2012). Concentra-
tion levels for the filled contour graphic were shown in
three bands: 200–2000, 2000–4000, and.4000mgm23,
similar to what is used operationally.
The satellite graphic simulated satellite ash retrievals.
To produce this graphic operationally, difference in
brightness temperature from satellite observations are
used at three different wavelengths. Then, using data
from a numerical weather prediction model and a radi-
ative transfer model, ash column loading (the sum of
all volcanic ash in a column), ash cloud height, and ash
particle size aremodeled. These quantities are dependent
not only on the numerical weather prediction and radia-
tive transfer models but also on the assumed refractive
index of the ash. The satellite representation in the survey
was artificially created and had six levels of concentration
(500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000mgm23), rather
than three levels for the filled contour representation.
It is of note that the level of ash concentration that was
safe to fly throughwas debated as the 2010Eyjafjallajökull
eruption continued (for more information on the timeline
of events, please see https://www.caa.co.uk/Safety-initiatives-
and-resources/Safety-projects/Volcanic-ash/A-history-of-
ash-and-aviation/). Further research has since been
conducted on the effects of volcanic ash on airplane
engines to further clarify what amount of volcanic ash is
considered safe (e.g., Clarkson et al. 2016).
The purpose of the first section of the survey was
twofold. First, by comparing decisions for different
levels of risk for the same graphic, we could determine
the risk appetite for each respondent. Second, by com-
paring the same flight path across different graphical
representations, we determined how different graphical
representations affected decision-making. The re-
sponses were checked for consistency. Responses of one
respondent, who appeared to misunderstand the task,
were removed from the numerical analysis of this sec-
tion only because the respondent’s flight decisions shif-
ted toward approval as ash concentrations increased.
The respondent’s qualitative feedback in this section
and quantitative and qualitative responses from the
other sections were included in this paper.
To establish context for responses from the first sec-
tion, respondents were asked their familiarity with, trust
in, and preferences for the three representations: poly-
gon, filled contour, and satellite. Familiarity and trust
were measured by rulers on 10-cm visual analog scales
ranging from ‘‘never seen before’’ (0 cm) to ‘‘have seen
frequently’’ (10 cm) for familiarity and ‘‘not at all
trustworthy’’ (0 cm) to ‘‘extremely trustworthy’’ (10 cm)
for trust. Preference was measured as a multiple-choice
question.
The second section tested how much uncertainty re-
spondents perceived in the filled contour and satellite
graphical representations, as well as whether including a
gap in the forecast ash concentration influenced their
perception of uncertainty. In the second section, re-
spondents were given four different forecasts and were
asked to draw no-fly zones directly on the forecast. The
forecasts were shown for two different graphical repre-
sentations (filled contour and satellite) and two different
shapes of volcanic ash plume. The two shapes of volcanic
ash plume were a ‘‘solid’’ ash plume with concentric
concentration levels and a ‘‘gap’’ ash plume with two
areas of high volcanic ash concentration and lower
concentrations between them (Fig. 1b).
To measure the perception of uncertainty in the sec-
ond section, each no-fly zone map was scanned into
Adobe Illustrator (a vector graphics software package).
The boundary edge of the no-fly zones drawn by each
participant were then traced as vector paths and sorted
into individual layers. With all of the no-fly zones digi-
tized as vectors, their areas were calculated and the
no-fly zones were overlaid and compared visually in
grouped layers.
The purpose of the third section of the survey was to
investigate the impact of conflicting forecast information
on decision-making by analyzing the respondents’ flight
decisions and confidence levels. Respondents were given
the same flight path overlaid onto two different filled
contour forecasts, described as being issued simulta-
neously, and were asked whether they would approve the
flight path. The forecasts were coded based on what color
contours the flight paths went through: blue–blue, gray–
gray, red–blue, and red–gray (Fig. 1c). Additionally, re-
spondents were asked what further information would
help them make a decision to fly or not fly given con-
flicting forecasts.
For all the flight decisions, respondents were told that
the forecast was issued 3h ago and valid now, when
flights would take off. They were also told they had
permission to fly through medium concentrations of
volcanic ash (2000–4000mgm23), corresponding to the
blue and gray areas in the filled contour representation
and the green, yellow, and orange areas in the satellite
representation (Fig. 1). This information was important
because the safe level of ash concentration varies ac-
cording to each airline’s safety assessment, required by
the CAA. None of the representations explicitly showed
uncertainty, even though uncertainty was inherent in all
three representations. For all flight decisions, re-
spondents were also asked how confident they were in
their decision, which was marked on a 10-cm visual
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analog scale ranging from ‘‘not at all confident’’ (0 cm)
to ‘‘extremely confident,’’ (10 cm) and was measured
using a ruler. All decision questions were also followed
by an open-ended question asking what information
influenced their decision.
The fourth section gathered respondents’ job title
(used to determine whether the respondent worked in
research or operations), length of time in current job,
age, and gender.
3. Results
a. How do graphical representations of volcanic ash
affect operational decisions?
Comparing flight decisions between graphical repre-
sentations, fewer respondents approved high-risk flight
paths (Fig. 2a) andmore respondents approved low- and
medium–low-risk flight paths (Figs. 2c and 2d) for the
filled contour and satellite representations than the
polygon representation. In the high-risk flight path, 17%
of respondents approved the flight when given the
polygon representation compared with 0% for the filled
contour and 4% for the satellite representations
(Fig. 2a). In the low-risk flight path, 71% of respondents
approved the flight when given the polygon represen-
tation compared with 83% for the filled contour and
83% for the satellite representations (Fig. 2d). In other
words, given concentration and location information,
the respondents were more risk averse for the riskier
flight paths and risk seeking for the safer flight paths.
The exception was the medium–high-risk flight path,
where both the polygon and filled contour representa-
tions encouraged risk-seeking decisions and the satellite
representation encouraged risk-averse decisions (29%
approved the flight path for both polygon and filled
contour representations compared with 21% for satel-
lite representation) (Fig. 2b).
The filled contour and satellite representations also
increased confidence in the respondents’ decisions
(Figs. 2e–h). The mean confidence across all flight
paths was 6.3 for the polygon, 7.1 for the filled contour,
and 7.2 for the satellite. Across all flight paths, there
was a significant difference at the 5% level between
mean confidence ratings across the different types of
graphical representation [analysis of variance (ANOVA);
F5 3:2, p5 0:04].
In an open-ended question about what information
influenced their flight decisions, over 50% of respon-
dents indicated they needed more information to help
them make a decision when given the polygon repre-
sentation, compared with 20% for the filled contour and
16% for the satellite representation.
FIG. 2. (a)–(d) Percent of respondents who approved flight and
(e)–(h) levels of confidence for different flight paths by graphical
representation. The polygon, filled contour, and satellite graphical
representations are shown as green, red, and indigo, respectively.
Path A (high risk) is shown in (a) and (e), path B (medium–high
risk) is shown in (b) and (f), path C (medium–low risk) is shown in
(c) and (g), and pathD (low risk) is shown in (d) and (h). Graphical
representations used for this section of the survey are shown in
Fig. 1a. Levels of confidence are rated on a scale from 0 (‘‘not at all
confident’’) to 10 (‘‘extremely confident’’). The upper and lower
whiskers represent the maximum and minimum values, re-
spectively. The top and bottom of the box represent the 75th and
25th percentiles, respectively. The bar in the box represents the
median. The star represents the mean. Circles on either side of the
whiskers are outliers.
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Respondents were asked in an open-ended format
what further information they would need from each
graphical representation to be more confident in their
decisions. The responses varied widely and included
altitude information, observations, past model perfor-
mance, meteorological information, higher resolution,
and uncertainty information. Interestingly, 9 of the 16
respondents representing research mentioned needing
uncertainty, probability, accuracy, or confidence infor-
mation, whereas no respondents representing opera-
tions mentioned any of the above.
Separating the flight decisions by occupation, re-
spondents working in operations (n5 9) were more risk
seeking than those in research (n515), with a higher
percentage of respondents choosing to approve the
flight path for all levels of risk (52% of the decisions
of respondents in operations compared with 38% of
the decisions of respondents in research; Fig. 3a). This
relationship was not statistically significant, perhaps
because of the small sample size (t test: t5 1:4, p5 0:18).
Respondents representing operations were more confi-
dent in their decisions across all flight paths (means 7.4–
9.0) than those in research (means 5.1–7.4; Fig. 3b). The
difference in mean confidence between respondents in
operations and research was significant at the 5% level
(t test: t5 4:6, p, 0:001).
The respondents were most familiar with the filled
contour (mean 6.7) and polygon (mean 6.1) representa-
tions and least familiar with the satellite representation
(mean 5.3; Fig. 4a). However, the respondents trusted the
satellite representation (mean 6.6)more than the polygon
(mean 5.4) and filled contour (mean 4.8) representations
(Fig. 4b). Respondents in operations (n5 9) and re-
search (n5 16) had different familiarity in the graphical
representations. Respondents in research were most fa-
miliar with the filled contour representation (mean 6.0),
FIG. 3. (a) Percent of respondents who approved flight and (b) levels of confidence for dif-
ferent flight paths by occupation in either research (green) or operations (red). Graphical
representations used for this section of the survey are shown in Fig. 1a. Levels of confidence are
rated on a scale from 0 (‘‘not at all confident’’) to 10 (‘‘extremely confident’’). The box plot
(b) is formatted as in Fig. 2.
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followed by the satellite (mean 5.1) and polygon (mean
4.9) representations, compared with those in operations,
who were most familiar with the polygon (mean 8.3),
followed by filled contour (mean 7.9) and satellite rep-
resentations (mean 5.6; Fig. 4a).
Respondents trusted the satellite graphical represen-
tation the most (mean 6.6) followed by the polygon
(mean 5.4) and filled contour (mean 4.8) representa-
tions. Respondents in operations trusted all graphical
representations (mean 6.4) more than those in research
(mean 5.1; Fig. 4b). The difference in mean trust be-
tween operations and research was not statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level (t test: t5 1:3; p5 0:22).
Product preferences varied among the respondents
and whether they represented research or operations.
Respondents in research preferred filled contour (45%)
and satellite representations (45%), while respondents
in operations preferred the satellite representation
(42%; Fig. 4c). Only respondents representing opera-
tions preferred ‘‘other’’ representations and specified
graphics showing ash column loading and observational
data. Ash column loading, which shows the sum of all
the volcanic ash in a column, is similar to the satellite
representation given in the survey, which showed the
peak concentration in the column.
b. Do users infer uncertainty in graphical forecasts of
volcanic ash?
When given a single volcanic ash forecast and four
flight paths of differing risk (section 1 of the survey;
Fig. 1a), the respondents were conservative in their de-
cisions. Only 79% of the low-risk flight paths (path D),
which traveled through safe concentrations of volcanic
ash across all graphical representations, were approved
(Fig. 2d). This conservatism suggests that respondents
infer uncertainty in the forecasts, otherwise 100% of
respondents would approve the low-risk flight paths.
Respondents were asked to draw a no-fly zone around
two different shapes of volcanic ash forecasts, one
showing a gap between high concentrations of volcanic
ash (simulating potential error in satellite retrieval of
volcanic ash concentrations, as described in section 2) and
one with a single area of high volcanic ash concentration
(section 2 of the survey; Fig. 1b). Six of the 24 respondents
drew their no-fly zones to allow flights through the gap
between the two areas of high volcanic ash concentra-
tions, shown by overlaying the no-fly zones (Fig. 5). Four
of these six respondents were in operations.
To quantify the differences in the perception of
forecast uncertainty for the gap and solid forecasts, the
areas of the no-fly zones drawn by respondents were
calculated. Respondents tended to draw no-fly zones
with larger areas for the gap (mean 1214mm2) than for
the solid (mean 1013mm2) forecasts (Fig. 5b). However,
the difference in means between solid and gap forecasts
were not significantly different at the 5% level (t test:
t521:0, p5 0:32). The areas drawn in the different
conditions may have been influenced by the larger area
red zone in the gap (357mm2) than the solid (241mm2)
forecast.
Most of the respondents’ no-fly zone areas were larger
than the areas of the red zones on the forecasts, again
suggesting that the respondents inferred uncertainty
from the forecasts. For the gap forecasts, the hand-
drawn no-fly zones were between 7% smaller and 866%
larger than the red zone (mean size was 231% larger
than the red zone). For the solid forecasts, the hand-
drawn no-fly zones were between 31% smaller and
FIG. 4. (a) Familiarity with, (b) trust in, and (c) preferences of graphical representations by occupation in either research (green) or
operations (red). Levels of familiarity and trust are rated on a scale from 0 (‘Never seen before’’ or ‘‘Not at all trustworthy’’) to 10 (‘‘Have
seen frequently’’ or ‘‘Extremely trustworthy’’). The box plots are formatted as in Fig. 2.
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1182% larger than the red zone (mean size was 305%
larger than the red zone). Only two respondents drew
no-fly zones that were within 10% of the size of the red
zone for the gap forecast and only three for the solid
forecast. Because so few respondents drew no-fly zones
that were within 10%of the size of the red zones for both
forecasts, we assume that the no-fly zones were in-
tentionally drawn larger than the red zone.
There was little difference in confidence in no-fly zones
for the gap than the solid forecasts (Fig. 5c). The mean
confidence in the no-fly zone for the gap forecasts was 5.1
compared with 5.3 for the solid forecasts. Again, the
mean confidence was not significantly different between
the solid and gap no-fly zones (t test: t5 0:3, p5 0:73)
The combination of being conservative in decisions
and drawing larger no-fly zones suggests that respon-
dents infer uncertainty in forecasts. This will be dis-
cussed further in section 4.
c. How do users make decisions when given
conflicting forecasts?
In the third section of the survey, respondents were
given conflicting forecasts for the same flight path and
asked if theywould approve the flight path (Fig. 1c).Recall
that respondents were informed they could fly through
blue and gray regions on the map but not red regions.
When given conflicting forecasts, respondents were
overall more risk averse for the lower-risk decisions
(neither forecast indicates the flight path travels through
unsafe concentrations, blue–blue and gray–gray) and
risk seeking for the higher-risk decisions (one forecast
indicates the flight path travels through unsafe concen-
trations, red–blue and red–gray; Fig. 6a) compared with
the single forecast decisions from section 1 of the survey.
For the lower-risk forecasts, only 52% of respondents
would approve the flights in the blue–blue forecast and
FIG. 5. (a)Heatmap showing overlaid no-fly zones drawn by the respondents for the gap and solid forecasts.Darker
colors indicate more respondents drawing a no-fly zone over that area. The black outlines show where respondents
were told it was unsafe to fly. (b) Calculated areas of the no-fly zones (mm2) by forecast type of either gap (green) or
solid (red) (c) Levels of confidence in the no-fly zones by forecast type of either gap (green) or solid (red). Graphical
representations used for this section of the survey are shown in Fig. 1b. The box plots are formatted as in Fig. 2.
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52% would approve the flights in the gray–gray forecast
(Fig. 6a), more conservative than when given a single
forecast (79% and 61% would approve the low- and
medium–low-risk forecasts; Figs. 2d and 2c, respec-
tively). For the higher-risk forecasts, 16% would ap-
prove the flights in the red–blue forecast and 20%would
approve flights in the red–gray forecasts (Fig. 6a) (26%
and 7% would approve the medium–high- and high-risk
single forecasts; Figs. 2a and 2b, respectively).
Respondents representing operations were more risk
seeking than those in research. For the higher-risk
forecasts, 22% of respondents representing operations
would approve the flights in the red–blue forecast and
22% in the red–gray forecasts compared with 13% and
19% of those in research, respectively. In the lower-risk
forecasts, 67% of respondents in operations would ap-
prove the gray–gray forecast compared with 44% of
those in research. The only exception was the lowest-
risk decision (blue–blue), where 44% of respondents
representing operations approved the flight path com-
pared with 56% of those in research (Fig. 6a), as was the
case for single forecasts (see section 3a). The difference
in mean decision was not statistically significant at the
5% level (t test: t5 0:4, p5 0:71).
Confidence levels were lower for decisions given
conflicting forecast information than for those with a
single forecast (Figs. 2e–h vs Fig. 6b). For all respon-
dents, mean confidence levels for decisions given con-
flicting forecasts ranged from 5.7 to 6.3, compared with
6.2–7.8 for single forecasts. This relationship was not
statistically significant, perhaps due to small sample size
(t test: t521:6, p5 0:12). Respondents in operations
were more confident in their decisions when given
multiple forecasts (mean 6.7–8.4) than those in research
(mean 4.6–5.9; Fig. 6b), as was the case for single fore-
casts (see section 3a). The difference inmean confidence
between operations and research was significant at the
5% level (t test: t5 2:7, p5 0:01).
After each conflicting forecast, respondents were
asked, in an open-ended format, what information influ-
enced their decisions. When given conflicting forecasts,
64% of respondents indicated they needed more infor-
mation compared with 52% of respondents in the single
forecast decisions. Respondents were then asked what
further information they needed to help them make de-
cisions given conflicting forecasts. There were a wide
range of suggestions, including observational data; past
model performance; meteorological information, includ-
ing wind speed and direction; information on model in-
put; more model ensemble members; information about
damage to engines; and uncertainty information. Of the
10 respondents requesting uncertainty information for
conflicting forecasts, 9 represented research.
4. Discussion
The survey results suggested that giving volcanic ash
concentration information in addition to the location of
the outermost extent of the volcanic ash made the re-
spondents more risk averse in high-risk decisions and
FIG. 6. (a) Percent of respondents who approved flight and (b) levels of confidence for flight paths given con-
flicting forecasts by occupation in either research (green) or operations (red). Graphical representations used for
this section of the survey are shown in Fig. 1c. Levels of confidence are rated on a scale from 0 (‘‘Not at all
confident’’) to 10 (‘‘Extremely confident’’). The box plot (b) is formatted as in Fig. 2.
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more risk seeking in low-risk decisions. In an open-
ended follow-up question, respondents asked for further
information more often when given only the out-
ermost extent of the volcanic ash than when provided
with ash concentration information. One of the main
concerns respondents representing operations raised
during the discussion at the end of the workshop was
airline traffic disruption due to volcanic ash eruptions.
Airlines want to maintain their high levels of safety
while reducing the number of flight cancellations and
diversions. In that context, our results suggest that
providing volcanic ash concentration information is
useful to operations because it encourages decisions to
fly through safe volcanic ash concentrations and dis-
courages decisions to fly through higher, potentially
dangerous volcanic ash concentrations for aircraft.
Providing more forecast information (specifically,
providing probabilistic forecast information) had sim-
ilar effects in other decision-making studies (e.g.,
Joslyn et al. 2007; Nadav-Greenberg and Joslyn 2009;
Roulston and Kaplan 2009; Joslyn and LeClerc 2012).
Similarly, providing probabilistic contours graphically
in tornado warnings increased protective action in the
highest-probability areas when compared with a poly-
gon only (Ash et al. 2014).
Although ash concentration information seemed to
improve the respondents’ decisions, providing conflict-
ing volcanic ash concentration forecasts, which can be
the case in operations when multiple VAACs are pro-
ducing forecasts on the same eruption, had the opposite
effect. Given two conflicting forecasts, respondents’
decisions were more risk seeking in high-risk situations
compared with high-risk decisions given a single fore-
cast. Respondents were also less confident in their de-
cisions when given conflicting forecasts and asked for
more information more often than when given a single
forecast. However, during the discussion at the end of
the workshop, one respondent representing operations
said the respondent’s company uses both the official
VAAC forecasts and proprietary volcanic ash forecasts.
If these two forecasts differ, the respondent said they
would only ever increase the company’s no-fly zones,
never decrease them. This comment is not supported by
the quantitative results from the survey. The action of
seeking multiple sources to confirm decisions occurred
with stakeholders in flash flooding as well (Morss et al.
2015). Seeking multiple sources, however, puts decision-
makers at risk of confirmation bias (preferring information
that supports their previously held beliefs; e.g., Jonas
et al. 2001). Further research into decision-making given
conflicting information is necessary, especially since
stakeholders facing different hazards similarly seek
multiple forecasts.
The question of what further information would help
decision-making given conflicting forecasts yielded awide
range of responses for a small sample of respondents,
meaning there is no one-size-fits-all approach to pro-
viding volcanic ash information. Thompson et al. (2015),
who studied preferences of volcanic hazard map repre-
sentations for stakeholders in New Zealand, also found
that user needs varied widely and one map could not
meet all needs. Instead, Thompson et al. (2015) suggest
thatmultiplemaps be used that communicate a consistent
message in different ways to suit all users’ needs.
An additional concern was that respondents were
least familiar with, but most trusting in, the satellite
graphical representation. The concern with respondents
trusting an unfamiliar graphical representation is a lack
of knowledge in the ways in which the representation is
unreliable. For example, the satellite retrievals are not
direct observations; they have been produced by using
brightness temperatures from satellite observations and
data from numerical weather prediction and radiative
transfer models (e.g., Francis et al. 2012). Satellite re-
trievals may be affected by errors in the models, mete-
orological cloud, or the angle at which the satellite is
viewing the cloud (Millington et al. 2012). Additionally,
satellite retrievals are not forecasts, but instead suggest
where ash was located in the past. These locations, of
course, can change over time, which is not currently
represented in the satellite representation. Lack of un-
derstanding of the limitations of the satellite graphic or
any other graphical representation may result in poor
decision-making. Therefore, further training on the
limitations of forecasts and the satellite graphic and its
shortcomings could be provided to end users. Providing
training on information has previously been shown to
help risk judgments (e.g., McCloy et al. 2007).
One suggestion of changes to volcanic ash forecasts,
especially from respondents representing research, was
to include uncertainty information. Results from the
survey indicated that respondents made their own ad-
justments for uncertainty in the volcanic ash forecasts.
For example, the respondents were conservative overall
in their decision-making, with one-fifth of respondents
not approving flight paths through safe levels of volcanic
ash concentrations, perhaps inferring uncertainty in the
location and concentration of volcanic ash. Addition-
ally, when asked to draw no-fly zones around forecasts,
the areas of most respondents’ no-fly zones were larger
than the areas of unsafe ash concentrations. Similarly,
when a nonexpert sample made decisions given de-
terministic rain and temperature forecasts, some took
protective action even when the forecast was on the safe
side of the threshold, again inferring uncertainty (Morss
et al. 2010). Although respondents were told in the
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survey instructions the levels of ash concentrations
considered safe, respondents may have inferred more
uncertainty due to the debate over what concentration
of volcanic ash was safe during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull
eruption and ongoing research into the effects of vol-
canic ash on airplane engines (e.g., Clarkson et al. 2016).
Respondents may also have inferred uncertainty due to
other reasons, such as not trusting the forecast.
One problem with users inferring uncertainty is that
there may actually be more or less uncertainty in the
forecast depending on the conditions that day than the
respondents are assuming. For example, the wide range
of sizes of no-fly zones implies there is no universally
assumed amount of uncertainty in the forecasts, which
could inhibit decision-making. This is one explanation
for the fact that respondents representing operations
were more risk seeking and confident than those rep-
resenting research, approving flight paths closer to the
center of the ash plume and through higher concentra-
tions of volcanic ash and being more likely to allow
flights through the gap between high concentrations of
volcanic ash. If the respondents representing operations
inferred less uncertainty in the forecast, then they would
make decisions to fly closer to high concentrations of
volcanic ash and be more confident of the boundaries
shown in the forecasts. One way to investigate this issue
is to test decision-making given graphical representa-
tions, including uncertainty information, and to train
users on how to interpret such information. Past re-
search suggests that including probabilistic information
in forecasts helps decision-making (e.g., Roulston and
Kaplan 2009; Joslyn and LeClerc 2012; Ash et al. 2014).
Although research indicates that uncertainty infor-
mation in forecasts helps decision-making, respondents
in operations stated they do not want uncertainty in-
formation. During the discussion at the end of the
workshop, respondents were asked if uncertainty in-
formation would be useful if provided in volcanic ash
forecasts. Respondents in research were keen to provide
uncertainty information, which could be possible using
ensemble forecasts or emulators of ash dispersionmodels
(Harvey et al. 2016). However, respondents in operations
said they preferred deterministic forecasts. One respon-
dent in operations said, ‘‘I have a fundamental problem
using forecast uncertainty. If the best people in the world
(VAACs) are not confident, are you really going to take
the risk?’’ This was verified by an open-ended survey
question, where all of the respondents who specifically
stated that uncertainty information would make them
more confident in their decisions were in research. In a
separate open-ended question, 9 of the 10 respondents
who stated uncertainty informationwould help themmake
decisions given conflicting forecasts were in research.
Because there are so many operational decisions to be
made in a short time during a volcanic eruption, re-
spondents in operations were concerned that digesting
uncertainty information would take too much time.
Experts in volcanic ash are not the only community to
prefer deterministic forecasts. Nobert et al. (2010) found
that flood managers also preferred deterministic forecasts,
stating that they were not convinced probabilistic infor-
mation could be made useful. Perhaps providing examples
of graphics with uncertainty and practicing implementing
them in training on real eruptions in Southeast Asia and
Alaska would provide a better understanding of whether
uncertainty information would be useful in forecasts and
also provide opportunities for verification.
Interestingly, there seemed to be a difference in def-
inition of uncertainty information between the respon-
dents in operations and research. When the respondent
in operations mentioned that the respondent’s company
paid for a proprietary volcanic ash forecast to compare
with the official VAAC forecasts, the researchers in the
room interpreted this action as one way to represent
uncertainty: by providing multiple outputs for compar-
ison. The operators did not interpret this action as
seeking uncertainty information. This suggests there
needs to be more conversation and perhaps a different
choice of vocabularywhen discussing uncertainty between
operations and research. Terms such as probabilistic
forecasts,multiple model outputs, and confidencemight
elicit different, more meaningful conversations between
the groups than the vague umbrella term uncertainty.
It is important to note that each airline operator is re-
sponsible for decision-making in volcanic ash eruptions.
These decisions are based on the safety risk assessment
submitted to the CAA (Safety and Airspace Regulation
Group 2014). Any changes to official graphics would re-
quire new safety assessments to be conducted by each
airline. Therefore, it would take a long time to implement
changes to volcanic ash forecasts. Thismakes volcanic ash
and its impact on aviation different from most industries,
where communication and decision-making practices can
change more quickly.
5. Conclusions
To discuss issues in forecasts and observations of
volcanic ash and its effect on aviation, a group of 25
delegates from the United Kingdom representing op-
erations and research were invited to a workshop in
London. During the workshop, the respondents com-
pleted a survey consisting of numerous decisions given
different representations of volcanic ash forecasts. The
survey was designed to determine how different graph-
ical representations of volcanic ash forecast affect flight
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planning decisions, if users infer uncertainty in graphical
volcanic ash forecasts, and how flight decisions are made
given conflicting volcanic ash forecasts.
When given forecasts containing ash concentration
information in addition to the predicted location of the
outermost extent of volcanic ash cloud, respondents
becamemore risk seeking in flight paths farther from the
center of the ash plume and more risk averse in flight
paths closer to the center of the ash plume. Additionally,
fewer respondents mentioned they needed more in-
formation to help make their decisions when given
the volcanic ash concentration forecasts. Therefore,
our results indicated providing ash concentration
information seems to encourage better decision-
making by reducing the number of flight cancella-
tions, delays, and diversions when it is safe to fly.
However, the respondents were most trusting in and
least familiar with the satellite data, indicating more
training is needed on the uses and shortcomings of the
satellite representation.
Overall, the respondents were conservative in their
decision-making, with only 80% of flights through safe
concentrations approved given a single forecast and only
50% of flights through safe concentrations approved
given conflicting forecasts. In addition, the respondents
drew no-fly zones that were larger than the areas of
unsafe ash concentrations (no-fly zones drawn by users
had means of 243% and 331% larger than the gap and
solid forecast unsafe concentration zones, respectively).
This implied that the respondents inferred uncertainty
in the deterministic volcanic ash forecasts. Respondents
representing operations were more risk seeking and
confident than those representing research in their flight
decisions, perhaps because the two groups inferred dif-
ferent levels of uncertainty in the forecasts.
When given two conflicting forecasts, respondents
became more conservative, being less likely to approve
flight paths. However, respondents were more risk
seeking in high-risk flight paths (when one forecast
suggested the flight would travel through unsafe con-
centrations) and more risk averse in low-risk flight paths
(when neither forecast suggested the flight would travel
through unsafe concentrations) when given conflicting
forecasts compared with single forecasts. Despite this
observation, during the discussion following the survey,
respondents indicated that when given conflicting in-
formation, they only ever increase their no-fly zone or
become more risk averse. This anecdotal evidence
contradicts the findings from the survey and indicates
inaccurate perception of the process among users. Be-
cause conflicting forecasts can be present in many nat-
ural hazards, further research in decision-making given
conflicting information is warranted.
There was no one-size-fits-all approach to volcanic ash
forecasts, with many different suggestions for additional
information to include in the forecasts. When discussing
including uncertainty in graphical representations of vol-
canic ash forecasts, respondents representing operations
stated that theywanted only deterministic information, not
uncertainty information. However, there seemed to be a
difference in the definition of uncertainty between the re-
searchers and operations, warranting further conversation
and collaboration between the operations and research
communities. Continuing this collaboration and encour-
aging similar collaborations across hazards anduser groups
will help develop meaningful ways to convert environ-
mental data into information useful to decision-makers.
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